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The economic ties between China and Africa have witnessed rapid and
continuous growth for the last decade.1 Bilateral trade volume has
increased from US$ 10.59 billion in 2000 to US$ 210.25 billion in 2013,
an increase of twenty times within fourteen years.2 More recently, Chinese
enterprises shifted their focus from trade to investment. According to the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)’s database, there were only
† Tsinghua University and Harvard Univeristy. The authors would like to thank
Xiong Xinghan and Janet Eom for their contributions to this paper. The African
Development Bank provided funding for the authors to do related work. The viewpoints
in the paper, however, only represent those of the authors.
1. See Maria Pigato & Wenxia Tang, China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in
an Evolving Global Context, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 2015), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21788.
2. See NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001
tbl.17-7 (2001), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB2001e/
ml/indexE.htm; NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2014
tbl.11-6 (2014), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm.
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888 enterprises registered to invest in Africa before 2010.3 From January
2010 to January 2015, however, 2,161 firms had registered their outward
investments to Africa.4 That is to say, the number of Chinese investments
in Africa within the past five years more than doubled the total number of
investments from the previous twenty years.5 Correspondingly, the stock
of Chinese outward foreign direct investment in Africa also rose from US$
0.618 billion in 2003 to US$ 26.19 billion in 2013.6
The rapid expansion of Chinese investments in Africa has attracted
global attention. Policymakers, business people, civil society, and citizens
are not only interested in investigating how Chinese investments influence
Africa economically and politically, but also are concerned with the impact
of Chinese enterprises on the continent’s environment. Africa is well
known for its pristine forests and savannas, for the natural life which is
still relatively untouched by industrialization, and for unique but fragile
ecosystems which are facing the serious challenge of global climate change.
When a large number of Chinese enterprises enter the continent, they are
set to alter the landscape greatly through the gigantic scale of construction
and operations. Unfortunately, Chinese enterprises do not have a good
track record of environmental practice either domestically or overseas.7
They are often criticized for reckless commercial exploitation without sufficient consideration of social-environmental consequences.8 For instance,
in 2006, the major Chinese state-owned oil conglomerate Sinopec was
accused of illegally prospecting for oil in Gabon’s Loango National Park.9
The company carved roads through the forest, dynamited areas of the park,
and caused mass pollution.10 In June 2013, Ghanaian authorities arrested
over one hundred foreign gold miners, most of whom were Chinese.11
3. Database of Registered Investment Projects, CHINESE MINISTRY OF COM. [hereinafter
MOFCOM Database], http://wszw.hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/fecp/fem/corp/fem_cert_stat_
view_list.jsp (last visited Jan. 31, 2015). This database (in Chinese) shows MOFCOM’s
registered investment projects overseas.
4. Id.
5. Id. Though the MOFCOM database is the single most complete listing of Chinese investments in Africa, it does not necessarily depict a precise picture of Chinese
investments on the ground. Many Chinese companies never register with MOFCOM and
therefore are not included in the list.
6. NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2004 tbl.1815 (2004), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/indexeh.htm; NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2014 tbl.11-19 (2014), http://www.stats
.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm.
7. See, e.g., Aly Song, China Says Polluting Industry Still Growing Too Fast, Heavy
Smog Alert for Beijing, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
03/25/us-china-environment-pollution-idUSBREA2O0BZ20140325.
8. See Ian Taylor, China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa, CHINADIALOGUE (Feb. 2,
2007), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/741-China-s-environmental-footprint-inAfrica.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Ming Zhongguo Gongmin Jiana Beibu; Junjing Songyong Cunmin Xijie Huaren
) [124 Chinese citizens arrested in Ghana;
(
police encourage villagers to ransack Chinese] TENCENT NEWS (June 6, 2013), news.qq
.com/a/20130606/000651.htm. See Afua Hirsch, Ghana deports thousands in crackdown
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These Chinese businessmen not only illegally invested in small-scale mining, but also polluted lakes and rivers through poor operational practices.12 In August 2013, the Chadian government suspended China
National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) license for oil exploration in the
country.13 In the firm’s operational area, large quantities of oil spill were
reportedly discovered.14
In this context, it is necessary and timely to examine Chinese firms’
environmental practice in Africa. Literature about Chinese firms’ environmental impact appeared as early as China-Africa engagements attracted the
global public’s attention. Ian Taylor argued that China’s environmental
concerns at home have driven its firms to go to Africa for resources, likely
leading to exploitation of Africa’s environment.15 Michelle Chan-Fishel,
Marcel Kitissou, and Tina Butler pointed out that China’s mineral and timber operations in Africa do not have good environmental records, but they
also argued that Chinese firms’ track records are not markedly different
from those of other nationalities.16 Douglas Scott, in a report prepared for
Conservation International, pointed out the potential dangers of Chinese
mining, oil, and gas operations in Africa due to their proximity to areas of
high conservation value.17 Oliver Hensengerth studied the construction of
Bui dam in Ghana by Sinohydro.18 He argued that even if the environmental practices are not stellar, the Chinese company appeared to abide by the
local laws.19 Yet however intriguing these snapshots are, these scattered
case studies cannot give us a complete picture. Chinese investments need
to be examined more systematically in order to see larger patterns— not
only about whether environmental abuses are occurring, but also in which
sectors and why.
on illegal Chinese goldminers, THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 2013), http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2013/jul/15/ghana-deports-chinese-goldminers.
12. See Hirsch, supra note 11.
13. Chen Zhiyu, Zhade Zanting Zhongshiyou Kaicai Huodong, Cheng Qi Weifan
Huanjing Fagui (
) [Chad temporarily halts
CNPC extraction activity, cites violations of environmental regulations], GLOBAL TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2013-08/4243582.html. See
Natasha Howitt, Chad suspends CNPC’s oil operations after oil spill, CHINADIALOGUE (Aug.
22, 2013), https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6315-Chad-suspends-CNPC-s-oil-operations-after-oil-spill/en.
14. Chen, supra note 13; Howitt, supra note 13.
15. Taylor, supra note 8.
16. Tina Butler, Growing Pains and Growing Alliances: China, Timber and Africa, in
AFRICA IN CHINA’S GLOBAL STRATEGY 156, 156– 61 (Marcel Kitissou ed., 2007); Michelle
Chan-Fishel, Environmental Impact: More of the Same, in AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA
IN AFRICA 139, 139– 52 (Firoze Manji & Stephen Marks eds., 2007).
17. Douglas Scott, Do Chinese Extraction (Mining, Oil & Gas) Activities in Africa
Overlap with Areas of Conservation Value? 4 (unpublished report) (on file at Conservation International), http://www.academia.edu/1002354/Do_Chinese_Extraction_Min
ing_Oil_and_Gas_Activities_in_Africa_overlap_with_Areas_of_Conservation_Value.
18. Oliver Hensengerth, Interaction of Chinese Institutions with Host Governments
in Dam Construction: The Bui Dam in Ghana 4 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished discussion
paper), http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_3.2001.pdf.
19. See id.
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At the policy level, Peter Bosshard believed that strengthening the regulation of socio-environmental impacts of overseas Chinese investments was
in China’s own interest, but at the time, the regulatory framework was still
too simple and weak.20 Recently, Campagnon and Alejandro discussed the
latest trends of China’s externally oriented environmental policy, but did
not sufficiently examine the connection between policy and practice on the
ground at the sites of outbound investment.21 Clearly, another salient
research question is whether and how Chinese government policy impacts
the operations of Chinese firms as they invest in other developing
countries.
This Article presents a more complete and clear picture of the environmental impact of Chinese investments in Africa. Mainly based on interviews and field trips in Beijing and Africa between 2012 and 2014, this
Article not only describes the practices of Chinese enterprises in various
sectors and of different types, but also offers a review of the Chinese government’s regulations and policies on firms’ environment-related practices
overseas. Most importantly, we would like to shed light on the reasons
behind the activities of Chinese firms and the policies of the Chinese government. We argue that both the environmental impact and the root cause
of Chinese engagements are diverse. The level of negative environmental
impact varies by industry and company attributes, such as size and connection to the Chinese government. Some negative impacts are caused by
the lack of awareness of Chinese investors, some can be attributed to
defects in national or international regulatory systems, and others are the
results of expanding global capitalism, which is common to investors from
all countries. In addition, we find that China has a different view on the
relationship between development and environmental protections than
Western countries. This means that despite some convergence in recent
years, China will not necessarily end up aligning with the existing standards of environmental conservation, but instead may seek to revise it with
new perspectives. Critics ought to avoid a simplistic, stereotyped understanding of the effects and dynamism of the Chinese engagements. Only
by taking these complexities and nuances into full consideration can we
find feasible and effective methods to improve Chinese firms’ environmental practices in Africa.
To make sense of the multiple interplays between public and private
sector forces, national and international dynamics, and policy and practice, this Article offers a simple theoretical framework. We posit that there
are three major types of conduct that mitigate harmful environmental consequences of economic activity, implicating varying levels of outside imposition on for-profit firms. In addition, for any given environmentally20. Peter Bosshard, China’s Environmental Footprint in Africa, S. AFR. INST. INT’L AFF.
(Apr. 2008), http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_download/234-china-africa-policy-brief-no-3april-2008.
21. Daniel Compagnon & Audrey Alejandro, China’s External Environmental Policy:
Understanding China’s Environmental Impact in Africa and How It Is Addressed, 15 ENVTL.
PRAC. 220, 221 (2013).
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related action, there may be widely diverse drivers of that action, ranging
from hard dollars-and-sense business logic to societal conceptions of the
public good. Hence, one of the central tenets of this Article is the necessity
to disaggregate the broad concern about China’s impact on Africa’s environment into a more nuanced understanding of the multiple actors and
motivations at play.
Types of conduct
Voluntary

Imposed

Drivers of conduct

1 Private sector
voluntary action

• Business logic (i.e., high costs
over medium- to long-term if
environment is not safeguarded)
• Customer preferences
• Managers’ ability & experiences
• Interaction with local African
government officials

2 Government
guidelines and
regulation
• By China
• By African nations

• International relations and norms
• Valuing of public goods
• Public pressure (e.g., by NGOs
and civil society)

3 International law

• International relations and norms
• Trade rules
• Public pressure (e.g., by NGOs
and civil society)

This Article is divided into five parts. Part I focuses on the private
sector part of the framework above. Parts II and III move to the government
portion, and Parts IV and V explore the dynamic interplay between the
three archetypes identified. Specifically, Part I investigates how Chinese
enterprises’ operations in Africa transform the social-environmental landscape there, highlighting the fact that different sectors and types of companies show different patterns of behavior with regard to the environment.
Part II focuses on Chinese government policy on environmental practices
of its companies in Africa. Chinese banks’ attitudes are also considered
here, as they play an important role in influencing investments overseas.
Part III analyzes Chinese views on the relationship between economic
development and environment. This can help us better understand the reasons behind Chinese government and firms’ behaviors. Part IV makes a
comparison of how other countries monitor and regulate the environmental practices of their firms’ overseas operations. Part V aims to identify
feasible approaches towards environmental conservation in developing
countries.
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Overview of Chinese Enterprises’ Environmental Footprint in Africa

Describing thousands of Chinese investments in Africa as a whole can
be too general and simplistic. Enterprises’ environmental practices may
vary greatly according to different countries’ regulations, size of investments, ownership, and industrial sectors.22 Each of Africa’s fifty-four
countries and multiple regional groupings has their own environmental
regulations, which shape diverse entrepreneurial behaviors in each context.23 Due to length limitations, this Article cannot cover the performance
of Chinese firms in all African countries. A useful way to begin to disaggregate this large and complex whole is to look at characteristics by ownership and by sector, as the former is a useful way of understanding
entrepreneurial decision-making and the latter reflects differences in business and regulatory forces exerted differentially by industry.
Ownership and size of investments make a big difference when it
comes to compliance with environmental standards and willingness to
invest in proactive socio-environmental preservation. Generally speaking,
we have found a divide between large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
small private businesses. The larger companies (with capital of over US$
10 million), most of which are SOEs, pay more attention to socio-environmental issues, whereas smaller private business often evade government
control and sometimes unscrupulously pursue short-term profits at the
cost of environmental and social goods.24 As an official in the Chinese
Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) said,
Large state-owned enterprises are doing fine with Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”). They have the capacity and awareness to do it. The small
private companies are more problematic, especially the mining and timber
traders. They cause damage to Africa’s environment and are very difficult to
manage.25

There are several reasons for this gap. First, large companies usually
have long-term investment horizons.26 Hence, they have a stake in creating
a friendly investment environment in the host country, whereas private
businesses can be short-term focused. In particular, many smaller companies are run by founder-owners, who are entrepreneurs aiming eventually
to retire back to China rather than build businesses in perpetuity in Africa.
22. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 17 (examining Chinese environmental practices in
various contexts).
23. See MOHAMMED A. BEKHECHI & JEAN-ROGER MERCIER, THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A STUDY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 13– 22 (2002), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2002/05/30/000094946_02051004035924/Rendered/
PDF/multi0page.pdf.
24. Interview with Yuchuan Yang, Team Leader, Project Management Division II,
Foreign Economic Cooperation Office, Ministry of Environmental Protection, in Beijing,
China (Sept. 27, 2014).
25. Id.
26. DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL., 2014 STUDY ON HOW INVESTMENT HORIZON AND EXPECTATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER BASE IMPACT CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 1 (2014), https://www
.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/2014_Investment-Horizon-Final_0.pdf.
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Hence, they are more likely simply to move to another country if business
prospects sour due to environmental or social damage. Second, large companies are often scrutinized more closely by authorities and by the public.27 Thus, quite a few of them have dedicated public relations
departments and more sophisticated attitudes, as well as resourcing to
implement related internal controls related to socio-environmental
issues.28 In contrast, smaller private companies are more inclined to solve
problems that arise in an ad hoc manner, or “under the table.”29 Third,
Chinese embassies and government commercial offices located in African
countries regularly contact and visit larger companies, but have no capacity to track smaller companies, with the exception of crisis situations.30
Nonetheless, large SOEs are only better in the relative sense. Negative
reports on these firms’ practices, such as the earlier mentioned stories on
Sinopec and CNPC, are not uncommon in African media.31 Notably, large
SOEs make up thirty-eight percent of the investments registered in the
MOFCOM database.32 Of these, roughly half are central governmentowned enterprises, and half are provincial government-owned, which are
on average smaller than the central SOEs.33 A number of Chinese overseas
investments, however— particularly small private firms— do not register
with MOFCOM, so the real proportion of purely private Chinese investment is likely to be much greater than approximately sixty percent in numbers.34 Even so, the scale of SOEs’ operations in Africa dwarfs the typical
private investment; hence, SOEs’ environmental impact may in fact be as
large as or more consequential than private investment.
Another reason for the diversity of environmental impact is the industrial sector in which a firm works. The MOFCOM database gives us a
sense of the proportion of firms involved in each industry (see Table 1).35
This data shows that Chinese investments are concentrated in several sectors such as trade, manufacturing, and mining. Among the industries that
have attracted a significant number of Chinese firms (using the threshold
of more than five percent), manufacturing, mining, construction, and agriculture are particularly relevant to environment concerns. Below, Chinese
companies’ respective environmental practices in these four major industries in Africa are discussed.
27. See Yang, supra note 24.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Lucy Corkin, Competition or Collaboration? Chinese & South African
Transnational Companies in Africa, 35 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 128, 130 (2008); interview
with Ma Futao, Secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Ethiopia, in Addis
Ababa, Eth. (2009).
31. See also Philippe Alfroy, China Sparks Conservation Uproar in Gabon, IOL (Sept.
29, 2006), http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/china-sparks-conservation-uproar-ingabon-1.295607?ot=inmsa.ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot.
32. MOFCOM Database, supra note 3.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Please note that the total sum exceeds one hundred percent because some firms
operate in multiple industries.
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Table 1. Industrial Sectors of Chinese Firms’ Involvement

% of MOFCOMIndustry
registered firms
Wholesale and retail trade
72.0%
Manufacturing
46.5%
Mining
44.5%
Leasing and business services
31.4%
Scientific, technical services and geological prospecting
29.5%
Construction industry
24.2%
Residential services and other services
8.3%
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery
7.7%
Real Estate
5.0%
Transportation, storage and postal services
4.3%
Hospitality industry
2.2%
Information transmission, computer services and
software
1.3%
Electricity, gas and water production and supply
0.6%
Financial industry
0.4%
Culture, sports and entertainment
0.3%
Education
0.2%
Health, social security and social welfare
0.1%
Water conservancy, environment and public facilities
management
0.1%
Public administration and social organizations
0.1%
International organizations
0.0%

A.

Manufacturing

Chinese enterprises are active in a wide range of manufacturing sectors in Africa, including processing of raw materials, plastics, clothing, furniture, and food.36 Their environmental practices vary largely according to
their products and business models.37 Some of these firms serve domestic
African markets, especially in populous countries like Nigeria.38 Others
set up factories in Africa to supply manufactured products, such as clothes
and shoes, to European and American clients, such as Levi’s, The Gap, and
36. See, e.g., Ron Sandrey & Hannah Edinger, China’s Manufacturing and Industrialization in Africa 6 (Afr. Dev. Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 128, 2011), http://www.afdb
.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working%20128.pdf.
37. See Christopher Alessi & Beina Xu, China in Africa, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/china/china-africa/p9557.
38. See MIRIA PIGATO & WENXIA TANG, CHINA AND AFRICA: EXPANDING ECONOMIC TIES
IN AN EVOLVING GLOBAL CONTEXT 1 (Mar. 2015), http://www.worldbank.org/content/
dam/Worldbank/Event/Africa/Investing%20in%20Africa%20Forum/2015/investing-inafrica-forum-china-and-africa-expanding-economic-ties-in-an-evolving-global-context.pdf.
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Walmart.39 This trend was accelerated in the wake of the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) that provided tariff-free access to the U.S.
market for certain African countries.40 These firms need to abide not only
by the regulations of African countries, but also the corporate social
responsibility (CSR) requirements of their Western clients. During recent
years, European and American firms have significantly raised the bar on
environmental and social compliance for their business operations, as well
as for those of their suppliers.41 These additional CSR requirements supplement African governments’ local administration to limit the environmental impact of industrialization to a socially acceptable level.
When Chinese manufacturers are not subject to outside customer
pressures and are monitored by African authorities alone, the situation is
often more challenging. One problem is that African countries have different regulatory systems than China does, so some Chinese firms are not
familiar with or used to such systems. For instance, a Chinese factory
owner in Botswana complained that he had to hire a third-party consulting
firm to complete a required environmental inspection report.42 He perceived this to be an additional cost burden for him because in China, the
officials did the inspection.43 Lack of applicable standards is another common problem. A Chinese sisal farmer in Tanzania said that the waste water
from sisal processing had a high concentration of organic materials, which
may harm waters in surrounding areas.44 Although the discharge of waste
water was regulated in China and other countries, Tanzania did not have
requirement in this respect yet.45 Consequently, sisal farms in Tanzania
treated the waste water without following a common stringent standard.46
As more Chinese firms enter Africa’s underdeveloped manufacturing sectors, they often bring machines, technologies, and production processes
39. Christopher Maloney, All Dressed Up With No Place to Go? Lesotho’s Rollercoaster Experience with Apparel (Mar. 27, 2006) (unpublished MPA thesis, Harvard
Kennedy School of Government), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/index.php/content/
download/66902/1240418/version/1/file/maloney-sypa.pdf.
40. See John Njiraini, AGOA: The US– Africa Trade Dilemma, AFR. RENEWAL (Dec.
2014), http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/agoa-us%E2%80%
93africa-trade-dilemma.
41. As one example, The Gap has consistently evolved and elevated its requirements
for its suppliers to provide adequate workplace standards. See Dan Henkle, Gap Inc. sees
supplier ownership of compliance with workplace standards as an essential element of
socially responsible sourcing, 25 J. OF ORG. EXCELLENCE 17 (2005). Another example is
Walmart elevating its environmental standards for suppliers. See Wal-Mart Ramps Up
Standards for Suppliers in China, Around the Globe, GREENBIZ (Oct. 22, 2008), http://
www.greenbiz.com/news/2008/10/22/wal-mart-ramps-standards-suppliers-chinaaround-globe.
42. Interview with Mr. Yan, Chinese Factory Owner, in Gaborone, Bots. (Aug. 2013).
43. Id.
44. Brigitte Read, Ploughing in Africa: The Story of a Chinese Sisal farm in Tanzania,
CHINA-AFR. REPORTING PROJECT (June 19, 2013), http://china-africa-reporting.co.za/
2013/06/ploughing-africa-the-story-of-a-chinese-sisal-farm-in-tanzania.
45. Interview with Guan Shanyuan, Manager of Chinese Sisal Farm, in Dar es
Salaam, Tanz. (Aug. 2014).
46. Id.
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that are new to African markets.47 Local authorities face serious capacity
constraints in regulating these newcomers appropriately.48
Notably, quite a few newly arriving Chinese manufacturers are working in sectors that tend to cause more pollution, such as small-scale steel
production and leather processing.49 As Chinese societal awareness of the
need to protect the environment has risen steadily, along with tightening of
environmental regulations in China, factories generating waste and hazardous materials need to spend increasing amounts of money in waste treatment.50 These factors push factory owners to relocate the polluting parts
of their business to regions where production costs are lower and public
resistance is less. Seeing that some African jurisdictions have relatively
lower requirements regarding waste treatment, some Chinese factories have
shifted their production bases to Africa.51 This includes processing of raw
skins, manufacturing of non-biodegradable plastic bags, and steel production using relatively older, more polluting technology.52 Interestingly,
some African governments showed welcoming attitudes towards such relocations. As an Ethiopian official stated, “It’s true that tanneries may produce unpleasant smell and pollute water, but we can accept this. Our
priority now is to build industrial capacity and create employment.”53
B.

Extractives

More than other industries, Chinese extractives industries are a bifurcated bunch. On one end of the spectrum, large state-owned oil companies
like Sinopec have well-staffed, dedicated CSR departments and issue
annual reports on sustainability.54 On the other end of the spectrum,
small, fly-by-night mining companies regularly flout local regulation and
engage in environmentally and socially destructive practices.55
Small-scale Chinese private mining companies have caused serious
47. Interview with Lei Changqing, General Manager, Chang Qing International
Investment & Ocean Kiss Furniture, in Dar es Salaam, Tanz. (Aug. 2014); interview with
He Mingliang, President, China-Africa Overseas Leather Co., in Addis Ababa, Eth. (July
2012).
48. Changqing, supra note 47; Mingliang, supra note 47.
49. Interview with Wondu Legesse Gizaw, Director of Leather Indus. Dev. Inst., in
Addis Ababa, Eth. (July 2012).
50. Jonathan Kaiman, China strengthens environmental laws, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/25/china-strengthensenvironmental-laws-polluting-factories.
51. Sophia Pale, China in Africa: a Shift in the Global Manufacturing Center, NEW
EASTERN OUTLOOK (Sept. 23, 2014), http://journal-neo.org/2014/09/23/china-in-africaa-shift-in-the-global-manufacturing-center.
52. Gizaw, supra note 49.
53. Id.
54. See generally SINOPEC CORP., COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (2014).
55. See MICHAEL L. DOUGHERTY, BY THE GUN OR BY THE BRIBE: FIRM SIZE, ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION AMONG MINING COMPANIES IN GUATEMALA 11 (Sept. 2015),
http://www.u4.no/publications/by-the-gun-or-by-the-bribe-firm-size-environmental-governance-and-corruption-among-mining-companies-in-guatemala/downloadasset/3900.
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damage to the environment in several countries.56 In Ghana, the government arrested hundreds of illegal Chinese and other origin gold miners in
June 2013.57 These small-scale miners were accused of water and soil pollution.58 A large number of small-scale Chinese miners also operate in the
Lubumbashi area of the Democratic Republic of Congo.59 Because the
administration in this region is apparently weak, the environmental damage from mining activities is reportedly significant.60 Larger-scale firms do
have better environmental practices, but they still have accidents and violations.61 Because of their larger size, these incidents may cause greater
damage and attract more public attention.
Although almost half of the Chinese investments registered with
MOFCOM claimed that they engage in the extractives business, the reality
of mining investments looks quite different.62 Most Chinese investments
in the extractives sector are only at the stage of prospecting or exploration.63 Using Tanzania as an example, MOFCOM data shows that nineteen
firms are registered for mining in the country. An author’s field visit in
August 2014, however, found that none of these companies were really
operating any mines on the ground. Only one firm was preparing to open
a coal mine in Tanzania, and others were merely prospecting or trading
minerals. Similarly, in oil, China imports large volumes of oil from Africa,
but Chinese firms do not have shares or operatorship in many oil fields
because of late entry into the market and technological constraints. European and American giants operate and control most of Africa’s oil fields.64
Therefore, the impact of Chinese investments on Africa’s extractive sector
and on the environment is relatively small and local.
C.

Construction

Chinese construction companies in Africa generally follow local regulations and conduct social and environmental impact assessments before
project commencement.65 Usually, the Chinese Investors Commission
56. See David S. Shinn, The Environmental Impact of China’s Investment in Africa,
INT’L POL’Y DIG. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/04/08/
the-environmental-impact-of-china-s-investment-in-africa/.
57. See Palash Ghosh, Fool’s Gold: Chinese In Ghana Resented For Running Illegal
Mines, Destroying Environment, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.ibtimes
.com/fools-gold-chinese-ghana-resented-running-illegal-mines-destroying-environment1213883.
58. See id.
59. See RTS. & ACCOUNTABILITY IN DEV., CHINESE MINING OPERATIONS IN KATANGA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 25 (Sept. 2009), http://www.raid-uk.org/sites/default/
files/drc-china-report.pdf.
60. See id. at 6– 7.
61. See id. at 8.
62. MOFCOM Database, supra note 3.
63. Id.
64. See Tang Xiaoyang, Models of Chinese Engagement in Africa’s Extractive Sectors
and Their Implication, 56 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 27 (2014).
65. Interview with Liu Shujun, Commercial Office, Chinese Embassy in Accra,
Ghana (July 2014); interview with Chen Chao, Commercial Office, Chinese Embassy in
Dar es Salaam, Tanz. (Aug. 2014).
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designs projects and drafts the assessments, then submits them for
approval to African authorities.66 Large investors generally follow this
practice in African countries, but in several cases, Chinese institutes did
not know the specifics of Africa’s environment and simply copied the Chinese model in their project design.67 For example, the original designer of
the Zambia Lusaka Multi-facility Economic Zone and the Angola Kilamba
New City, both developed by Chinese companies, had never been to Africa
when he conceived both projects.68 If the developers had not revised their
design due to difficulty of implementation, then these unrealistic plans
would have generated significant unexpected environmental
consequences.69
The standard process described above is also vulnerable to unlawful
behavior on the African side. Local environmental officials are responsible
for evaluation and approval, and some Chinese managers have the impression that these officials are more interested in asking for money than seriously evaluating the plan.70 Our interviewees reported cases in which
African government officials gave them the impression that environmental
considerations are a mere formality as long as they receive a sufficient
bribe.71 Consequently, some Chinese firms would rather pay a bribe to
get through the approval process rather than allocate spending for real
environmental assessment and protection.72
D.

Agriculture

There are not many Chinese farms in Africa, and most are small (less
than 1000 hectares).73 The environmental and social practices of Chinese
farms vary across type of investment and countries.
On the positive side, many Chinese farmers in Africa appreciate the
relatively unspoiled natural environment and, drawing lessons from
China’s history of environmental deterioration, actively take measures to
preserve the local ecosystem. For example, Wanbao rice farm in
Mozambique does not use machines to dispel birds like local farmers do.74
In the farmer’s opinion, local farmers dispel birds because they believe
birds eat a large portion of their grains.75 The situation is different, however, for the Wanbao farmers. As manager Luo Yonghao said, “Our yields
are large. What the birds eat is just a very small portion of it. Around 70%
66. See David Benazeraf & Ana Alves, ‘Oil for Housing’: Chinese-built New Towns in
Angola, S. AFR. INST. FOR INT’L AFF. 3– 4 (Apr. 2014), http://www.saiia.org.za/doc_view/
507-oil-for-housing-chinese-built-new-towns-in-angola.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Interview with Yang Weiqiang, Lawyer, China Railway Wuju Group, in Accra,
Ghana (July 2014).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, WILL AFRICA FEED CHINA? 165– 69 (2015).
74. Interview with Luo Yonghao, Manager of Wanbao Rice Farm, in Mozam. (Aug.
2014).
75. See id.
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of birds’ diets are pests, which benefits farming activity”.76 In addition, the
Wanbao farm does not use pesticides and instead uses herbicides and a
small amount of urea as fertilizer.77 As Luo Yonghao said, “In China, the
use of pesticides caused a vicious circle. Pesticides killed insects, as well as
insects’ predators, namely birds. The reduction of birds caused an increase
of pests, and made farmers more reliant on pesticides.”78 Learning from
this lesson, the Wanbao farm attaches great importance to maintaining the
existing ecological system. Here, there is voluntary action by firms driven
by self-interest, because firms recognize that investment in environmental
protection today will mitigate costs in the future.
On the problematic side, a serious threat to Africa’s ecosystem is illegal logging and timber smuggling by Chinese firms.79 In response to these
concerns, the Chinese State Forestry Administration and MOFCOM jointly
issued the Guidelines on Sustainable Overseas Forests Management and
Utilization by Chinese Enterprises in 2009.80 Chinese officials blame
mainly private businessmen for these unlawful activities.81 This is confirmed by a report from the Center for International Forest Research,
which has tracked this issue in detail.82
Overall, we can see that the extent of Chinese firms’ impact on the
environment varies widely by ownership and by sector. At the firm level,
decision-making with regards to the environment is driven by several factors, including business logic (such as farms preserving the environment
in order to save fertilizer costs), customer preferences (such as manufacturers fulfilling the CSR requirements of their buyers), managers’ abilities and
expectations (such as the ability to conduct required assessments inhouse), and the microdynamics of interaction with local African government officials (such as construction firms encountering local officials asking for bribes).
II. Regulatory Efforts from the Chinese Side
Chinese enterprises in Africa are first and foremost subject to regulation by local authorities.83 From environmental impact assessments to reg76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., William Laurance, China’s Appetite for Wood Takes a Heavy Toll on Forests, YALE ENV’T 360 (Nov. 17, 2011), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_appetite_for_
wood_takes_a_heavy_toll_on_forests/2465/; China’s Illegal and Unsustainable Timber
Imports Ransack Mozambique’s Forests, EIA INT’L (July 23, 2014), https://eia-international.org/chinas-illegal-timber-imports-ransack-mozambiques-forests.
80. Zhongguo Qiye Jingwai Senlin Kechixu Jingying Liyong Zhinan
(
) [A Guidelines on Sustainable Overseas Forests
Management and Utilization by Chinese Enterprises] (promulgated by Chinese St. Forestry Admin. & Chinese Ministry Com., May 6, 2010) [hereinafter Forests Management
and Utilization], http://www.forestry.gov.cn/portal/main/s/224/content-401396.html.
81. See id.
82. Xiaoxue Weng et al., The Africa-China Timber Trade: Diverse Business Model Call
for Specialized Policy Responses, 28 CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTY RES. 1, 3, 7 (2014).
83. Id. at 1– 2.
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ular environmental inspections, each African country’s legislation and
administration set up the regulatory framework that all investors, whether
from China or elsewhere, need to follow. Traditionally, China has been a
strong advocate of the principle of judicial sovereignty, the notion that outsiders should not interfere in African authorities’ regulation of enterprises
in their own countries.84 In line with its famous “non-interference” foreign
policy, the Chinese government has long stressed that Chinese investors
overseas should fully abide by local authorities.85
The rapid increase in Chinese investment in Africa, however, and the
accompanying controversies about Chinese enterprises’ environmental
practices have brought growing pressure on the Chinese government.86
Reports on incidents such as illegal Chinese gold miners in Ghana or the
oil spill in Chad tarnished China’s international image.87 A survey by the
Ethics Institute of South Africa showed that citizens of multiple African
countries have negative perceptions about Chinese companies.88 In all
aspects, such as product quality, employment practice, social responsibility, and economic responsibility, respondents with negative views of Chinese companies outnumbered those who held positive views.89 In
particular, the environmental responsibility of Chinese firms was viewed
negatively: 53.9% of the interviewees had negative views, and only 11.1%
had positive views.90 The ballooning amount of complaints among the
African public and international groups must have attracted the Chinese
government’s attention. Whether out of concerns about its reputation or
for the purpose of securing friendly relationships with African nations, the
Chinese government has taken a series of steps lately to address the socioenvironmental practices of Chinese enterprises in Africa more actively.
At the end of 2007, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the Chinese government agency
that owns and regulates central government-owned enterprises, promulgated the Guidelines to the State-owned Enterprises Directly under the
Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities.91 The
document emphasizes the importance of corporate social responsibility for
84. See Richard Aldoo et al., Non-Interference 2.0: China’s Evolving Foreign Policy
towards a Changing Africa, 44 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFF. 107, 110– 12 (2015) (noting that
non-interference is part of Beijing’s “official foreign policy”).
85. Foreign Relations— Africa, GLOBAL SECURITY (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/forrel-africa.htm.
86. See Denise Leung, How Are China’s Overseas Investments Affecting the Environment?, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (May 9, 2013), http://www.wri.org/blog/2013/05/howare-china%E2%80%99s-overseas-investments-affecting-environment (noting that China’s
Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection have now issued
guidelines designed to protect the environment).
87. See Hirsch, supra note 11; Shinn, supra note 56.
88. G.J. Rossouw et al., Africans’ Perceptions of Chinese Business in Africa: A Survey,
2014 ETHICS INST. S. AFR. 1, 32.
89. Id. at 19, 22, 24, 27– 28.
90. Id. at 27.
91. Guanyu Zhongyang Qiye Lüxing Shehui Zeren de Zhidao Yijian
(
) [Guidelines to the State-owned Enterprises
Directly under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibilities]
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Chinese SOEs and asks SOEs to take measures for “[c]onstantly improving
ability of making sustainable profits.”92 Social responsibility is defined
broadly as product safety, resource conservation, technological innovation,
employee rights, and public welfare.93 SOEs are asked to establish a communication mechanism to disclose CSR activities and engage
stakeholders.94
In March 2009, MOFCOM and the State Forestry Administration
jointly published the Guide on Sustainable Overseas Forests Management
and Utilization by Chinese Enterprises.95 In February 2013, MOFCOM
and MEP also jointly published the Environmental Protection Guide for
Outbound Investment and Cooperation.96 These documents require Chinese enterprises not only to abide by the forestry and environmental protection laws of the country in which they are doing business, but also to
conduct environmental assessments and create an environmental management plan.97 Chinese enterprises are encouraged to engage in green procurement, recycling, and local community activities.98
In addition, Chinese business associations of various sectors have
issued or are working on CSR guidelines for the outbound investments in
their sectors.99 In September 2012, the China International Contractors
Association released the Guide on Social Responsibility for Chinese International Contractors to “establish a benchmark of social responsibility” for
construction firms and to encourage them to operate overseas contracting
projects in a more responsible way.100 Regarding environmental protection, the guide gives instructions on four aspects: environmental management, resource saving, waste and emission reduction, and ecological
protection.101 In October 2014, the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters issued the Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments.102 The
guidelines acknowledge that mining may have a significant impact on the
(promulgated by St.-owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Commission St. Council, Jan.
04, 2008) [hereinafter Corporate Social Responsibilities].
92. Id. ¶¶ 1– 4.
93. See id. ¶¶ 10– 15.
94. Id. ¶ 18.
95. Forests Management and Utilization, supra note 80.
96. Duiwai Touzi Hezuo Huanjing Baohu Zhinan (
)
[Guideline for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation] (promulgated by the Ministry of Com. & the Ministry of Envtl. Prot., Feb. 18, 2013, effective
Feb. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment], http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/bbb/201303/20130300043226.shtml.
97. See id. ¶ 11; Forests Management and Utilization, supra note 80, ¶¶ 3.3, 4.2.1,
5.3.5.
98. See Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment, supra note 96, ¶¶ 11, 15; Forests Management and Utilization, supra note 80, ¶¶ 5.2.2– 5.2.3, 6.2.1– 6.2.4.
99. See Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment, supra note 96, ¶¶ 11, 15.
100. CHINA INT’L CONTRACTORS ASS’N, GUIDE ON SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHINESE
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTORS 1 (2010).
101. Id. at 13– 14.
102. CHINA CHAMBER COM. METALS, MINS. & CHEMICALS IMPORTERS & EXPORTERS,
GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN OUTBOUND MINING INVESTMENTS 28 (2014) [hereinafter SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN OUTBOUND MINING], http://www.srz.com/files/upload/
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environment and require Chinese firms to develop appropriate plans and
conduct regular assessments.103
Though these documents cover a wide range of CSR topics, notably,
these Chinese texts are “Guides” or “Guidelines” rather than laws and regulations.104 Therefore, they operate more as suggestions and lack the binding force that laws have. Language-wise, these guidelines rarely employ the
imperative “shall” and instead often use the term “encourage” for environmental and social-protection actions.105 All the guidelines emphasize that
Chinese businesses should respect and abide by local laws in the country
of investment. Consequently, the guidelines are written in rather general
terms, with no specification for investment types or risk levels of investments.106 The guidelines presume that companies will find specific regulations in their host countries and decide their behaviors correspondingly.
Yet, this general orientation has been problematic in the African context. As noted earlier, African countries’ environmental regulations are not
always well established.107 Indeed, some foreign investors can make use of
loopholes in legislation and administration to lower environmental treatment standards “legally.”108 Under such circumstances, the principle of
abiding by local regulations may sound like empty words.
Moreover, Chinese firms on average have limited knowledge of local
laws. As Weiqian Yang, a Chinese lawyer in Ghana, said, “Chinese companies are not used to looking into laws to find their behavior standards.
They believe that money is the lubricant which can get everything
done.”109 To some extent, this is a continuation of common business
behavior in China, where connections with officials are often more important than laws. In Yang’s opinion, Chinese managers only vaguely knew
the local regulations, and few of them had a precise understanding of the
legal system and its requirements.110 One reason for this situation is the
lack of Chinese legal professionals working in Africa.111 Chinese investors
are impeded by an entrepreneurial culture that considers money rather
than laws and keeps them from carefully studying and obeying local
regulations.
Conflict_Minerals_Resource_Center/CCCMC_Guidelines_for_Social_Responsibility_in_
Outbound_Mining_Operations_English_Version.pdf.
103. Id. at 29.
104. See Shinn, supra note 56; Leung, supra note 86.
105. See, e.g., Forests Management and Utilization, supra note 80; Corporate Social
Responsibilities, supra note 91; Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment, supra note
96.
106. See, e.g., Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment, supra note 96.
107. See, e.g., Negusu Aklilu, Greening Africa-China Relations: African Agents Punching
Below their Weight?, 2 J. CHINA & INT’L REL. 26, 26 (2014).
108. See CHINA COUNCIL FOR INT’L COOP. ON ENV’T & DEV., INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND
ENVIRONMENT 326, 328 (2011), http://www.cciced.net/encciced/policyresearch/report/
201205/P020120529369994285106.pdf.
109. Yang, supra note 70.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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In spite of the practical difficulty of applying these guidelines to
Africa’s reality, the promulgation of the guidelines did demonstrate the
Chinese government’s and the industry’s proactive attitude regarding
socio-environmental impact, with a particular emphasis on environmental
issues. Not only do all the guidelines mention environmental responsibility, but as described above, two major documents are dedicated to environmental protection.112 As Radavoi and Bian observed, the Chinese
government tends to detach environmental issues from those of workers’ or
human rights, because transnational regulations of environmental practices are less controversial politically and are perceived to be more feasible
to implement.113 The release of five guidelines within seven years was a
promising start for China to regulate its extraterritorial corporations.
Challenges in implementation, however, show that mere guidelines from
the Chinese government are not sufficient. Putting effective changes into
practice requires more actions and more stakeholders.
Apart from the government, Chinese banks have played— and are playing— an important role in influencing companies’ overseas behaviors.
Many Chinese banks now have clear guidance regarding social and environment assessment when they give loans.114 The Export-Import Bank of
China (China Exim Bank) and the China Development Bank, the two most
important Chinese lenders to Africa-destined investments, require all project developers to complete a social and environmental impact assessment
before loan approval.115 The China Exim Bank also hires third-party consultants, often Western companies, to evaluate social and environmental
impacts before loan approval.116 Additionally, the China Exim Bank, the
China Development Bank, the China Industrial and Commercial Bank, and
the Bank of China have adopted the Equator Principles on green credit
policies, vetoing projects that do not pass environmental assessments.117
112. See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN OUTBOUND MINING, supra note 102, § 2.7; Forests
Management and Utilization, supra note 80, § 5.
113. See Ciprian N. Radavoi & Yongmin Bian, Enhancing the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Case for ‘Decoupling’ Environmental Issues, 16 ENVTL. L. REV.
168, 168, 170– 72 (2014).
114. See, e.g., Luse Xindai Zhiyin (
) [Green Credit Guidelines] (promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/
EngdocView.do?docID=3CE646AB629B46B9B533B1D8D9FF8C4A.
115. See Tightening EIA To Promote Multilateral Win-Win Outcomes— CDB’s “Green
Credit” Goes to the World, CHINA DEV. BANK (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.cdb.com.cn/
english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=4715; Strictly Apply Lending Checks to Meet Green Lending Standards, CHINA EXPORT-IMPORT BANK (Mar. 13, 2014), http://english.eximbank
.gov.cn/tm/en-TCN/index_655_24344.html.
116. See Zhonguo Jinchukou Yinhang Daikuan Xiangmu Huangjing yu Shehui Pingjia
Zhidao Yijian (
) [Guidelines for Environmental and Social Impact Assessments of the China Export and Import Bank’s (China
EXIM Bank) Loan Projects] (promulgated by The Export-Import Bank of China, Aug. 28,
2007, effective Aug. 28, 2007) THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF CHINA, Aug. 28, 2007, translated in Issuance Notice of the GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS OF THE CHINA EXPORT AND IMPORT BANK’S (CHINA EXIM BANK) LOAN PROJECTS (Int’l
Rivers ed., 2007).
117. See ADINA MATISOFF, MICHELLE CHAN & FRIENDS OF THE EARTH-US, THE GREEN
EVOLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND PRACTICE IN CHINA’S BANKING SECTOR 18 (2008).
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In 2008, the China Exim Bank suspended funding for an iron mining and
infrastructure construction project in the Belinga region of Gabon.118
According to the Gabonese government, the China Exim Bank required the
constructor of the project, a Chinese state-owned company, to conduct an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) conforming to international standards after the bank received a protest letter from a local NGO.119 This
case provided evidence for the effectiveness of banks in overseeing and
monitoring the overseas behaviors of Chinese firms.
Certification by international standards also helps to improve environmental practices. Over one hundred thousand Chinese enterprises have
attained certification with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard, which signifies that the enterprise has created
an effective environmental management system.120 This certification also
signals that these Chinese companies fulfill international environmental
best practices and consider environmental conservation even when they
operate overseas. In the words of a former SOE executive, Chinese firms
no longer have fundamental differences from Western companies regarding recognition of international criteria for environmental sustainability.
Currently, the main problem is implementation and practice.121
III. Environmental and Developmental Responsibility from the
Chinese Perspective
Despite the recent movement towards convergence with international
norms, China still has fundamental differences in how it views environmental issues. This core philosophical position drives part of the reason
for environmental disputes about Chinese investments in Africa. These
disputes ought to be separated from non-compliance with environmental
regulation, because they stem out of an agreed criterion and touch on principles that remain controversial.
Many of the controversies concentrate on infrastructure construction.
Chinese firms are frequently criticized for helping African countries build
dams and highways, which may have great impact on African ecosystems.122 Sudan’s Merowe dam on the Nile River is a representative case for
such controversies. Sinohydro and China International Water and Electric
Corporation were contracted to build the dam in 2003, and the China Exim
Bank was the main financier.123 The dam began operations in 2010.124 It
was the longest dam in the world at the time of its construction and was
118. See OXFAM HONG KONG, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S OVERSEAS FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: A MAPPING OF CHINESE LAWS AND STAKEHOLDERS 31– 32 (2012), http://www
.oxfam.org.hk/filemgr/2533/1367136257.pdf.
119. See id.
120. See Arthur P.J. Mol, Environmental Governance Through Information: China and
Vietnam, 30 SING. J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 114, 121 (2009).
121. See Arthur P.J. Mol, China’s Ascent and Africa’s Environment, 21 GLOBAL ENVTL.
CHANGE 785, 791 (2011).
122. See, e.g., Shinn, supra note 56.
123. See Bosshard, supra note 20.
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expected to double Sudan’s power capacity once it came online.125
Although Sudanese authorities had conducted and approved an EIA, a few
international NGOs and international institutions (including the United
Nations Environmental Programme) insisted that the EIA was sub-standard
and did not sufficiently consider downstream impacts.126 Moreover, the
Sudanese government’s violent resettlement of inhabitants from the dam
site attracted local and international attention. In this context, a few organizations accused Chinese enterprises of ignoring socio-environmental
consequences in implementing this project.127
Interestingly, the Chinese government and the firms involved also
emphasized environmental preservation in their response to this criticism,
though with a different focus. While international civil society highlighted
potential environmental detriment and forced relocation, the spokeswoman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made clear:
Hydraulic and hydropower facilities are infrastructure projects which are of
general interest for African countries. They are also critical for the long-term
economic development of African countries. In the related cooperation,
China attaches great importance to local people’s livelihood, to the environmental impact which may be caused by the projects. Strict environmental
assessments and environmental standards are implemented. China has
always required its companies to comply with local laws and regulations in
the course of operation in Africa.128

A Chinese project manager said that Chinese contractors and the
Sudanese government had invested additional amounts to treat carefully all
possible points of waste discharges so that hazardous materials would not
pollute the Nile River.129 He reported that construction waste, plastic
waste, and organic waste were classified and handled separately.130 In
order to counter criticism from environmental activists, the firms adopted
high-level European standards in a country where this was far from the
124. See President Al-Bashir Launches Operation of All Units of Merowe Dam, MEROWE
DAM PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/admin-en/newspublish/home.viewdetails.php?news_id=173.
125. See The Allard K. Lowenstein International Hum. Rts. Clinic Yale L. Sch. et al.,
An Analysis of Select Companies’ Operations in Sudan: A Resource for Divestment 15
(2005).
126. See CRISTIAN TEODORU ET AL., INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE MEROWE DAM PROJECT 7, 9 (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.novaquatis.eawag.ch/media/20060323/Independent-Review-20060323.pdf; UNEP, SUDAN
POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 226– 28 (2007).
127. See, e.g., Jim Giles, Tide of Censure for African Dams, 440 NATURE 393, 393– 94
(2006).
128. See Waijiaobu Fandui Guanyu Zhongfang zai Fei Chengjian Daba Weixie Huanbao
de Zhize (
), CHINANEWS (May 15,
2007), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2007/05-15/935747.shtml.
129. See Yu Honghai (
), & Fu Guohua (
), Zhonguo Shuidian Chengjian
de Shijie Zuichang Shuiba Quanbu Jungong (
),
CHINA ENERGY NEWS (Apr. 19, 2010), http://paper.people.com.cn/zgnyb/html/2010-04/
19/content_494270.htm.
130. See id.
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Here, we can see that the builders of the Merowe dam, like the opponents of the project, were aware of environmental protection too. Yet the
parties had divergent perspectives and evaluation criteria. One party,
believing in the fundamental good of the project, stressed the importance
of the dam for the socio-economic development of the local community
and tried to limit pollution caused by the dam’s construction. The other
side wanted to suspend the “mega-project” completely, arguing that it
would seriously impact the local ecosystem and the original inhabitants’
way of life. In fact, similar disputes about dam construction can be found
not only in Africa, but also around the world in modern times.132 In the
early twentieth century, the technological advances for constructing large
hydropower plants drove a wave of enthusiasm to build mega-dams in
Europe and America.133 The Grande Dixence Dam in Switzerland, the
Hoover Dam in the United States, and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the
United States were all celebrated as iconic projects during a time of rapid
industrialization, as they provided much-needed power, controlled floods,
and facilitated irrigation.134 Since the 1960s, however, large-scale dams
have faced rising criticism in the West.135 Main objections have included:
(1) large construction projects change natural water flows and affect life
cycles of fish and other species; (2) dams may increase sediment, accelerate accumulation of toxic materials, and degrade water quality; (3) large
numbers of inhabitants need to be resettled during construction, and
social costs may be very high; and (4) the gigantic size and complicated
processes of such projects are accompanied by huge risk, and many
megaprojects did not realize planned benefits in historic retrospect.136
Consequently, the construction of large hydropower plants almost
halted in Western countries after the 1970s.137 Instead, the trend there
shifted towards building small-scale hydraulic projects.138 Yet the interest
for mega-dams did not diminish in developing countries in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. China’s Three Gorges, Brazil and Paraguay’s Itaipu,
Ethiopia’s Tekeze, Sudan’s Merowe, and the proposed Grand Inga on the
Congo River all strive to be bigger and taller than what came before.139
New records in terms of dam size and power generation capacity have been
131. See id.
132. Dams: A Barrage of Criticism, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 16, 2000), www.economist
.com/node/423621.
133. Id.
134. See Michael Duchemin, Water, Power, and Tourism: Hoover Dam and the Making
of the New West, 86 U. CAL. PRESS 60, 60 (2009).
135. Dams: A Barrage of Criticism, supra note 132.
136. See, e.g., Dams— blessing and curse?, WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE (Jan. 30,
2016), http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/water/dams_initiative/dams/; Stephanie Joyce, Dams— The Advantages and Disadvantages, ENV’T, HEALTH & SAFETY ONLINE
(Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.ehso.com/ehshome/energydams.htm.
137. See Joyce, supra note 136.
138. Id.
139. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN103.txt

2016

unknown

Seq: 21

19-MAY-16

16:59

Social Responsibility or Development Responsibility?

89

set again and again.140 Regarding this phenomenon, environmental
activist groups in the West expressed concern and criticism, pointing out
various kinds of negative influences on environment and society.141 By
contrast, the defenders of mega-dams believed that large-scale infrastructure facilities are necessary for the development of poorer countries. Biswas and Tortajada from the Third World Centre for Water Management in
Mexico wrote:
There is no doubt that small dams and water-harvesting techniques will
undoubtedly help in rural areas and smaller urban areas . . . however, small
water structures alone would not be able to resolve the complex water
problems of urban areas and major industries where demands for water are
extremely high, and are increasing, and where rainfall is scanty and erratic.
Large and medium dams will be essential to continue to provide water to
meet the escalating needs of a steadily urbanizing world for decades to
come. People in the western world will have to realize that . . . . The situation
was previously no different in their own countries, where large dams had to
be built to satisfy their own water needs. Having completed the necessary
construction of large dams in their own countries, they are now opposed to
the construction of large dams in the developing world, where societal needs
are growing exponentially.142

China itself is a predominant supporter for large hydropower projects
in the world. By the end of 2005, there were 4,839 large dams whose
height exceeded thirty meters in China, accounting for 37.8% of all the
large dams in the world.143 Large hydropower projects were included in
the government’s strategic Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011– 2015) as a focal
area for development.144 The director of the Chinese Hydropower Administration acknowledged environmental risk related to hydropower plants,
but took the position of “taking the lighter one when comparing two
evils.”145 This means that not only is hydropower considered less harmful
to the environment in comparison to other forms of energy, but also that
underdevelopment is more undesirable than environmental change. The
Chinese government views industrialization and modernization as necessitating the evil of a nonzero amount of environmental degradation. Sometimes, the environment even needs to be transformed again to counter the
140. See generally Neil Ford, UN Throws Weight Behind Grand Inga, 310 AFR. BUS. J. 28
(June 2005); Bruce Handler, Biggest Dam Set in Latin America, WASH. POST (May 21,
1974); Ahmed Hassan Omer Khartoum, Merowe Dam Project: The Biggest Economic
Accomplishment in Sudan, SUDAN NEWS AGENCY (June 13, 2013).
141. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 140, at 29.
142. Asit K. Biswas & Cecilia Tortajada, Development and Large Dams: A Global Perspective, 17 WATER RESOURCES DEV. 9, 12 (2001).
) et al., Zhongguo 2008 Shuiku Daba Tongji, Jishu Jinzhan Yu
143. Jia Jinsheng (
Guanzhu De Wenti Jianlun (
),
ZHONGGUO DABA JIEHUI MISHU CHU (
) (2008), http://www.chincold
.org.cn/chincold/upload/news/lin200911254534542.pdf.
144. Woguo Shuidian Fazhan Shiru Kuaichedao Mubiao Zhizhi 3.5 Yi Qianwa
), ZHONGGUO NENGYUAN BAO
(
(
) (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.nea.gov.cn/2011-09/07/c_131109599.htm.
145. Id.
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changes caused by global industrialization. As an official of National
Energy Administration official explained:
Because of climate change, the precipitation belt moved northwards . . . this
requires construction of hydropower plants which have an adjustment function. Large and medium hydropower stations generally have such a function. Therefore, large and medium hydropower plants should be the focus of
construction.146

This is a core dilemma of global modernization today. Even when
developing countries do nothing, they may still suffer from the environmental impact caused by other countries’ industrialization. From this
viewpoint, they need technology and large-scale action to balance the environmental changes already unleashed by others.
To be sure, the rapid industrial development of China and other developing countries during recent years has contributed to global climate
change.147 In terms of per capita energy consumption, however, China
and other developing countries still lag significantly behind developed
Western countries.148 Per capita electricity consumption in China (3,298
kWh) was only a quarter of that in the United States (13,246 kWh) in
2011, whereas electricity consumption and production per capita in Sudan
(143 kWh) is less than two percent of that for an American.149 In France,
Germany, Canada, the United States, and other developed countries,
approximately seventy percent of the hydropower resources in their territories have been utilized; but in China, only approximately forty percent of
its hydropower potential has been developed; and in Africa, less than fourteen percent of the country’s hydropower potential has been tapped.150
Consequently, developing countries argue that limiting hydropower
exploitation will unfairly affect their development opportunities.

146. Id.
147. Jeffrey Ball, Climate Change Is Now in the Developing World’s Hands, SLATE MAG.
(Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/energy_around_the
_world/2013/11/warsaw_climate_talks_developing_countries_will_be_source_of_green
house_gas.html
148. International Energy Statistics: Total Primary Energy Consumption per Capita
(Million Btu per Person), ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/cf
apps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=44&pid=45&aid=2&cid=regions&syid=2005&ey
id=2009&unit=QBTU.
149. World Development Indicators: Power and Communications, THE WORLD BANK
(2015), http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.11#.
150. See Table 2; World Hydro Potential and Development, INTPOW NORWEGIAN
RENEWABLE ENERGY PARTNERS (Feb. 23, 2016) (citing Hydropower and Dams, World
Atlas, 2009), http://www.intpow.com/index.php?id=487&download=1.
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Table 2. Utilization of Hydropower Potential 2008

Country

Hydropower
Generation
(GWh/year)

USA
Germany
Canada
France
China
Sudan
DR Congo

270000
16975
372000
68600
684000
4333
7303

Economically
Feasible
Hydropower
potential
(GWh/year)
376000
20000
536000
98000
1753000
19000
145000

Utilization rate

71.81%
84.88%
69.40%
70.00%
39.02%
22.81%
5.04%

China’s own development needs and experiences make it sympathetic
to the needs of other developing countries. Consequently, mega-projects
which have not received funding from Western and multilateral institutions
often get approved by Chinese financers.151 In addition, with their competitive advantage from thousands of construction projects in China in the
past generation, Chinese firms have become the main contractors for dam
projects in the developing world.152 As of August 2012, Chinese firms
were involved in the construction or financing of 308 dams in seventy
countries.153
As we see from the Merowe dam case, it is too simplistic of an understanding to charge that environmental issues are simply neglected by the
advocates for large projects. Instead, they demand that the development
needs of poorer countries should be sufficiently considered along with
environmental impacts.154 As a South African engineer puts it:
We always forget that the Environmental Impact Assessment was originally
supposed to be an environmental and social impact assessment. We’ve seen
that the social element has largely been lost. You never hear a substantive
argument about the livelihood benefits of a project, you always hear about
the environmental benefits and impacts . . . [a]nd my concern is that we
need to rebalance the discussion to ensure that the loud voices of environmental advocates are heard, but are balanced by equally loud advocates for
social equity, which is very important as well as for economic growth, which
is a critical enabler of social development. And I think we’ve lost that.155
151. See China’s Global Role in Dam Building, INT’L RIVERS (Nov. 8, 2015), https://
www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/china-s-global-role-in-dam-building.
152. See id.
153. INT’L RIVERS, THE NEW GREAT WALLS: A GUIDE TO CHINA’S OVERSEAS DAM INDUSTRY
4 (2012), http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/intlrivers_newgreat
walls_2012_0.pdf
154. See Olivia Boyd, China Brings Dams Back to Africa, CHINADIALOGUE (Oct. 7, 2012),
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/5032-China-brings-dams-backto-Africa.
155. Id.
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Chinese constructors in Africa represent this balancing viewpoint.
Putting emphasis on developmental responsibility, they consider the transformation of the natural environment inevitable in the development process. Notably, developing countries are willing to pay environmental costs
not simply “in pursuit of materialism,” but rather to achieve social equity—
namely to reach a more similar development level with industrialized Western countries.156 In fact, these countries learned from historical experience that if they do not catch up with other countries’ development, then
they cannot manage even their own environment, as the global climate has
already been changing rapidly— a problem that paradoxically requires
resources that are only obtainable through economic development.
This dispute between development responsibility and environmental
preservation is set to continue for the coming decades. Various countries’
positions are still far from reaching consensus, as they are driven by divergent social, economic, political, and environmental needs. This is not necessarily a bad thing. While emerging countries keep striving for their
development rights, this developmentalism mindset also needs a balancing
voice to modulate the speed and severity of environmental change. Overall, it is important to recognize that both views are valid if balanced development is to be achieved. Of course, this important debate should not be
conflated with violations against existing environmental norms and standards. As noted in the first two Parts, a number of Chinese firms in Africa
did not abide by local or Chinese regulations.157 Due to lack of international juridical coordination, even existing uncontroversial environmental
regulations have not been appropriately implemented.158 This situation
deserves serious thought and rapid action. In the following Parts, a comparative study of how other countries regulate their private sectors’ environmental practices overseas will be made. Then we will offer some
suggestions for how the environmental impact of Chinese investments in
Africa may be ameliorated.
IV. U.S. and European Regulation of Environmental Impacts Overseas
When it comes to regulation of overseas business, the United States
and major European countries have a range of standards depending on the
type of offense. On one end of the spectrum is corruption, which is strictly
regulated.159 Forty-one industrialized countries have adopted the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, along with national regulations within each
signatory country to uphold the Convention.160 Two of the most wellknown regulations are the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., Shanyuan, supra note 45; Hirsch, supra note 11.
158. CHINA COUNCIL FOR INT’L COOP. ON ENV’T & DEV., supra note 108.
159. Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Nov. 21, 1997), http://www.
oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
160. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-1\CIN103.txt

2016

unknown

Seq: 25

Social Responsibility or Development Responsibility?

19-MAY-16

16:59

93

the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010.161 The enforcement of these laws has effectively reduced the corruption-related negative environmental practices of
Western multinational companies in foreign countries.162
Yet, when it comes to environmental practice specifically and other
kinds of corporate social responsibilities in foreign countries, Western regulations are much more lax. Although international treaties and norms
such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2002 World Earth Summit influenced the creation and implementation of environmental policies in the
United States and Europe, U.S. and European domestic laws do not strictly
regulate the environmental impact of their companies that go abroad.163
In fact, similar to some of the examples of Chinese companies cited above,
literature suggests that one motivation for Western companies going
abroad is the lack of regulation or applicability of domestic laws abroad.164
Although the Alien Tort Claims Act states, “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” hope
of strong regulations against overseas investments was set back when the
U.S. Supreme Court in 2013 unanimously rejected corporate liability
under the Act for certain extraterritorial violations of international human
rights norms.165
Therefore, similar to Chinese guidelines for overseas investments,
Western regulation of overseas investment primarily depends on voluntary
mechanisms. One example is the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, one of the most comprehensive international agreements in
this space.166 The OECD Guidelines is a set of “recommendations from
governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from countries
that are signatory to the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises including the Guidelines.”167 They cover labor
rights, human rights, environment, information disclosure, bribery, con161. See ARNOLD & PORTER, LLP, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE FCPA AND THE
UK BRIBERY ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 1 (Mar. 2012), http://www.ar
noldporter.com/resources/documents/Advisory%20Extraterritorial_Reach_FCPA_and_
UK_Bribery%20Act_Implications_International_Business.pdf.
162. See id.
163. See Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LIT. 132, 133 (1995). See
generally JEFFREY FRANKEL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 29– 30
(2009); NICK MABEY & RICHARD MCNALLY, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM POLLUTION HAVENS TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 43– 44 (1999); R. Daniel
Kelemen & David Vogel, Trading Places: The US and EU in International Environmental
Politics, 43 COMP. POL. STUD. 427, 427– 56 (2010).
164. See Rema Hanna, US Environmental Regulation and FDI: Evidence from a Panel of
US-Based Multinational Firms, 2 AM. ECON. J. 158, 162– 63 (2010).
165. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
166. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., About the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (Feb. 24, 2016), https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/about.
167. OECD WATCH, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Feb. 24,
2016), http://oecdwatch.org/oecd-guidelines.
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sumer interests, competition, taxation, and intellectual property rights.168
Because they are voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct, they are not legally binding on countries or companies.169
They are, however, consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognized standards, so the OECD and signatory governments are supposed
to ensure that they are implemented and observed via national laws and
international commitments.170 Unfortunately, monitoring and compliance does not automatically follow. Therefore, the Guidelines have become
both a dialogue between countries and a way to measure the behavior of
companies, but much work remains to be done before full implementation
can be said to be achieved.
Civil society and media play a major role in influencing Western companies’ behavior overseas. Often, the voices of social and environmental
advocacy that target large multinational corporations are so loud that corporations rely on highly paid public relations agencies as well as in-house
public relations professionals to deflect the criticisms of NGOs.171 NGOs
often sponsor their own scientific research, making them much more credible in the eyes of the public.172 In addition, they often cultivate linkages to
divestiture movements— like divestiture campaigns targeted to multiple university endowments during apartheid South Africa— creating linkages to
direct financiers of companies.173 Media linkage is also critical, as
research divestiture movements garner headlines. Also newsworthy are
instances of high-profile individuals and celebrities getting involved.
When Richard Branson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and U.S. financier
Warren Buffett all condemned oil exploration in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the public started to pay attention and hold companies
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See BINDU SHARMA, CONTEXTUALISING CSR IN ASIA: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ASIAN ECONOMIES AND THE DRIVERS THAT INFLUENCE ITS PRACTICE 1, 14– 16 (Apr.
2013), http://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=lien_re
ports; Kristie Byrum, The Role of the Public Relations Professional in Corporate Social
Responsibility Communication, CSRWIRE (Jul. 13, 2015), http://www.csrwire.com/blog/
posts/1599-the-role-of-the-public-relations-professional-in-corporate-social-responsibility-communication.
172. See Dagmar Lohan, Assessing the Mechanisms for the Input of Scientific Information into the UNFCCC, 17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 249, 284 (2006); Julie Teel,
Rapporteur’s Summary of the Deliberative Forum: Have NGOs Distorted or Illuminated the
Benefits and Hazards of Genetically Modified Organisms?, 13 COLO J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 137, 148 (2002).
173. See Shareen Hertel, The Paradox of Partnership: Assessing New Forms of NGO
Advocacy on Labor Rights, 24 J. ETHICS & INT’L. AFF. 171, 171 (2010); Jonathan P. Doh &
Nicolas M. Dahan, Presentation at the European Group for Organizational Studies Summer Workshop 2010: Social Movements and Social Networks: An Evolutionary Perspective on Contemporary U.S. Student Advocacy Campaigns 10 (uploaded Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/267226255_SOCIAL_MOVEMENTS_AND_
SOCIAL_NETWORKS_AN_EVOLUTIONARY_PERSPECTIVE_ON_CONTEMPORARY_
U.S._STUDENT_ADVOCACY_CAMPAIGNS.
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accountable.174
Arguably, companies’ biggest concern is the impact of reputational
damage on their business prospects. If civil society and the media raise
awareness of company practices, then the market through the mechanism
of consumer choice, rather than the heavy hand of the government, influences the behavior of companies.175 Companies in the West come under
close scrutiny by shareholders and consumers in their own countries.176
In contexts of robust civil society and media freedom, negative environmental consequences can be widely reported and cause backlash from the
public, who are also shareholders and customers. Therefore, the fear of
market consequences motivates companies to be cautious with environmental impact.
This logic, however, is essentially utilitarian, implying that environmental standards may be compromised if market gains outweigh the cost
of negative opinion from consumers and shareholders. For example, a
place like Equatorial Guinea does not rate highly in terms of stability,
transparency, and regulation.177 But companies like Marathon Oil still
operate there because they think they get more profit out of the investment
in oil than they lose through public criticism.178 This is an important shift
in the process by which public goods are valued, as cross-national business
increasingly results in the removal of questions of the value of public goods
from political arenas, to the arena of cost-benefit calculations by individual
firms.
To summarize, although the market is the ultimate constraining factor,
civil society and the media are often decisive in influencing markets and
public perception in the West. NGOs work within the OECD framework to
try to pressure companies to behave responsibly for the environment.
Media reinforces these ideas, and companies often respond in order to
maintain their reputation, customer base, and financing. By contrast, civil
society and media in China are strongly controlled by the government and
have far less power in forging public opinion. The model of checks and
balances by civil society and markets works far less reliably in China. How
can people build a mechanism that fits China’s unique context?
V.

Concluding Remarks and the Way Forward

So far, the characteristics of Chinese firms’ environmental practices in
Africa, as well as related measures taken by the Chinese government and
banks have been reviewed. Also, comparisons to perspectives and regulat174. John Vidal, Soco Halts Oil Exploration in Africa’s Virunga National Park, THE
GUARDIAN (June 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/11/
soco-oil-virunga-national-park-congo-wwf.
175. See Marylyn Carrigan Ahmad Attalla, The Myth of the Ethical Consumer— Do Ethics Matter in Purchase Behaviour?, 18 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 560, 574 (2001).
176. Id. at 563– 64.
177. Interview with Paige Snider, Commercial Official, U.S. Embassy, in Beijing,
China (Oct. 2014).
178. Id.
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ing mechanisms in Western countries were made. As a large number of
Chinese investments arrive in Africa within a short period of time, they
greatly transform the continent’s natural and social landscape. It is true
that not-so-stringent environmental regulations in Africa have attracted
firms from higher polluting sectors of China. Indeed, a few unscrupulous
Chinese investors lowered their environmental standards in Africa when
they found loopholes in the host countries’ regulations. Others may cause
unexpected socio-environmental consequences because of lack of local
knowledge or experience.
As Chinese investments in Africa continue growing rapidly, regulatory
systems ought to be enhanced correspondingly. To be sure, improving the
capacity of African authorities, which have the appropriate juridical sovereignty, is pivotal for any kind of regulatory enhancement. Efforts from the
Chinese side, however, are likewise important to influence the behaviors of
China’s multi-national companies. Concerned with reputation damage
caused by mounting environmental controversies, the Chinese government,
banks, and business associations have actually taken steps to raise the
environmental awareness of their companies in Africa, give guidance on
environmental best practices, and monitor the environmental impacts of
projects.
Chinese efforts to improve environmental practices are borrowed to a
large extent from international standards. As we have pointed out, major
banks have adopted green credit policies similar to the Equator Principles,
and hundreds of thousands of companies have passed ISO standards of
environmental management. In assessing potential avenues for future progress, however, four factors are important to highlight. First, China has a
fundamentally different view on the necessity of environmental change in
the process of economic development. Drawing from its own experience,
China realizes that fast industrial development must be accompanied by
large-scale social and environmental changes. The change is in fact not a
choice of one or several countries, but a necessary outcome of industrialization, as seen in developed countries. Nonetheless, today, developed
countries put more emphasis on preservation of the environment, while
developing countries stress equal rights of development. Both sides are
conscious of environmental protection, but their relative priorities differ.
These differing views reflect the different development stages of these
countries. Today, industrial development and modernization as well as
environmental conservation in the age of climate change is a must for
every country, developed or developing. The dilemma of economic development and environmental protection in the modern world is that industries and modern society necessarily impact the environment. For poor
countries, however, environmental conservation also requires commanding resources that are only obtained through wealth creation. Clearly, a
balance between development and environment is required. Yet countries
often legitimately diverge on where they believe this balance point to be.
China, being a developing country itself, calls for more space for development. This position will probably remain as a starting point for China’s
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environmental policy in the upcoming decades. So although there has
been a convergence of Chinese policy in recent years towards Western
norms, full convergence is not likely to occur.
Second, although full convergence is unlikely, given the fundamentally
different beliefs about the relative value of development versus environment, the Chinese government is more willing to accept international standards on environmental issues than human rights. Interestingly,
guidelines promulgated by the Chinese government deal almost exclusively
with environmental issues. One possible explanation is that environmental damage is easily visible, whereas evaluation of human rights is much
more subjective. The gap between China and the West is huge on conception and practice of human rights, but the gap is considerably smaller
when it comes to environmental protection. This partially accounts for
recent developments such as the U.S.-China bilateral agreement to work on
environmental issues. For organizations engaging with China on social
responsibility issues, this preference is important to bear in mind when
choosing appropriate strategies.
Third, China’s unique social structure necessitates a different regulating mechanism on its overseas investments than that of Western countries.
Civil society and the media mainly monitor multinational firms in the
West. Fear of being penalized in their major markets at home by shareholders and by customers prevents them from unscrupulously exploiting
the environment in foreign countries. Yet in China, neither a strong civil
society nor an independent media exists, and public awareness about overseas environments is not high enough to influence the domestic market. In
addition, numerous Chinese firms are small private enterprises operating
almost solely in Africa. They are not constrained by the above-mentioned
mechanism like the Western countries.
Nonetheless, international NGOs and media have been indirectly
influencing Chinese firms’ behaviors in Africa via the Chinese government, as China becomes more and more concerned about negative economic and political consequences caused by reputational damage due to
its firms’ poor environmental practices in Africa.179 The drafting process
of guidelines by various ministries and business associations during recent
years was significantly shaped by environmental NGOs.180 These guidelines can also serve to support civil society efforts. As a member of a Beijing-based NGO stated, “[t]hough [the guidelines] do not have binding
179. See BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, CHINA’S RISING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA: IS THERE
ROOM FOR CSR? 8– 9 (2008), http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_China_Rising_Influence_
in_Africa.pdf; Ciprian N. Radavoi & Yongmin Bian, Why China Should Regulate Its Overseas Investors’ Environmental Behavior, 5 BEIJING L. REV. 22, 25 (2014); Austin Strange et
al., China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection 10
(Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 323, 2013), http://www10.iadb.org/intal/
intalcdi/PE/2013/12317.pdf.
180. See David H. Shinn, China in Africa: Environmental Implications and the Law,
INT’L POL’Y DIG. (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2015/10/
25/china-in-africa-environmental-implications-and-the-law. See, e.g., Bosshard, supra
note 20, at 8.
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power, they show the attitudes of the Chinese government. NGOs and people in other countries can use these guidelines in their negotiation with
Chinese firms.”181
Last but not least, Chinese firms are much more inclined to pay bribes
rather than use laws to settle environmental issues. The Bribe Payers Index
ranks China as the second highest, only below Russia, on the likelihood
that their multinational businesses will use bribes when operating
abroad.182 Rampant bribery in Africa causes negligence in EIA and social
impact assessment processes, as well as inferior quality of construction
projects.183 Anti-corruption is a widely accepted standard by the international community. Most Western countries have strict laws in this respect,
but China did not sign the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials.184 It has gradually, however, realized the self-inflicted
damage caused by overseas bribery. Apart from the interruption of normal
market order, bribery hurts the Chinese firms themselves by increasing the
cost of doing business and making the firms vulnerable to further blackmail. In February 2011, the Eighth Amendment of the Chinese Penalty
Law added terms regarding overseas corruption.185 Although this law has
not been implemented with rigor, it prepares the legal grounds for addressing a key issue in Chinese environmental practices in Africa.
In the end, African countries are the ones that have juridical power to
regulate directly investments on their soil. Improvement of their legislation
and administration will play a decisive role in enhancing environmental
protection in Africa. The environmental problems accompanying Chinese
investments revealed that African authorities were not entirely prepared for
this new trend. These problems are not completely caused by foreigners,
but can also be caused by obsolete or incomplete regulations unfitting for
modern industries and by the inexperience of the administration vis-à-vis
foreign investors. For example, sometimes there are no standards for certain industrial products, and sometimes the EIA process turns into a matter of bribery.
181. Interview with Ren Peng, Expert, Global Env’t Inst., in Thai. (Nov. 2014).
182. See DEBORAH HARDOON & FINN HEINRICH, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2011 6 (Transparency Int’l, Oct. 2011), http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011/results.
183. See Benjamin Barczewski, How Well do Environmental Regulations Work in
Kenya?: A Case Study of the Thika Highway Improvement Project 7– 9 (Columbia U. Ctr.
for Sustainable Urban Dev., Working Paper, 2013), http://csud.ei.columbia.edu/files/
2013/06/How-Well-Do-Environmental-Regulations-Work-in-Kenya.pdf. See generally
HUSSEIN ABAZA ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED APPROACH (2004), http://www.unep.ch/etu/publications/textONUbr.pdf.
184. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 21 May 2014, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP.
& DEV. (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus
.pdf.
185. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, CHINA’S TIGHTENING LAW ON BRIBERY OF
OFFICIALS 1, 1– 2 (Mar. 2011), http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/
Knowledge/China’s%20tightening%20law%20on%20bribery%20of%20officials.pdf.
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Beyond these four factors, this Article overall highlights the fact that
there are multiple roads to a better future. In terms of responsible stewardship for the environment, the cases presented here support the framework
that we started with: there are at least three major avenues towards positive
change, and each of these three avenues can be driven by diverse interests.
Which strategy is appropriate and feasible depends on the dynamics of
industry, company ownership, and country context. It is time to move
beyond blanket statements about Chinese behavior in general in Africa and
towards more nuanced understandings of the differential impact of Chinese firms and the motivations behind their behaviors.
As investments from China, Asia, and other regions from the global
South are set to continue growing rapidly, they will impact Africa’s environment and society even more extensively and more powerfully. Africa
needs these investments for economic growth, but they also require corresponding improvement of environmental standards. Particularly as some
higher polluting industries relocate from China to African countries, which
nonetheless welcome them for the sake of economy and employment, people must take more stringent measures to avoid environmental disasters.
Although it is true that almost every country in the world has had to face
undesired environmental impacts in its history of industrialization, hopefully African countries can do better in their turn. Although the pristine
nature in Africa will probably change, hopefully African nations will not
repeat the mistakes of other regions that have led to the dead waters of
Lake Michigan in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century or
the Beijing smog of today. Perhaps a prosperous continent with a livable
environment will be a realistic target to achieve in the coming decades.
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